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Viewing cable 10BERLIN194, BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENCE CHIEF DISCUSSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BERLIN194 2010-02-19 11:11 2011-01-28 00:12 SECRET Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO7651
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #0194/01 0501111
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191111Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6579
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0005
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0563
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2134
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0608
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1804
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUKAAKA/USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000194 
  
 SIPDIS 
  
 E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2035 
 TAG KCFE, PARM, PREL, NATO, NPT, CD, UK, GM 
 SUBJECT: BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE DEFENCE CHIEF DISCUSSES 
 EUROPEAN SECURITY, NPT REVCON 
  
 Classified By: Political M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
  
 1. (S) Summary.  On the margins of the Munich Security 
 Conference, February 6, UK Foreign Office Director General 
 for Defense and Intelligence Mariot Leslie told U/S Tauscher 
 that the allies should negotiate with Russia a new follow-on 
 agreement to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. 
 Leslie also suggested that Egypt might abandon its 
 controversial NPT Revcon Middle East resolution language if 
 it were guaranteed a conference on the subject some time 
 after the May 2010 Review Conference.  To satisfy Moscow's 
 desire for greater inclusion, this conference could be held 
 in Russia.  Leslie also noted that she was fighting pressure 
 to abandon stalled FMCT discussions in the Conference on 
 Disarmament and take up negotiations elsewhere.  End Summary. 
  
 ------ 
 Russia 
 ------ 
  
 2. (S) Briefing on her recent visit to Moscow, Leslie said 
 Russian officials had cited their desire for missile defense 
 provisions as the main stumbling block in signing the 
 post-START agreement with the U.S.  The open question, she 
 said, was whether progressives in the Russian government 
 could out-maneuver the military on this sticking point. 
 Leslie also underscored her concerns about the proliferation 
 of missile technology in the Middle East and stressed the 
 need to turn the page on previous disputes with Russia over 
 this issue.  According to Leslie, Russian FM Lavrov had 
 agreed with her. 
  
 3. (S) Leslie underscored her belief that the Russians had 
 "lost out" during CFE and A/CFE negotiations and that the 
 allies should be open to a re-negotiation with Moscow on the 
 issue of conventional forces.  However, she recognized that 
 there would likely be strong opposition from flank states 
 like Turkey and Norway -- particularly given the spill-over 
 effects into the issue of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. 
 Separately, Leslie said she had been surprised by the sudden 
 release of the new Russian Defense Strategy.  While in 
 Moscow, she said Russian think tankers had discouraged her 
 from placing too much importance on the strategy.  Instead, 
 Leslie was told to look at Russia's upcoming nuclear 
 declaratory posture for better insights into top-level 
 thinking. 
  
 -------------------- 
 NPT Revcon and Egypt 
 -------------------- 
  
 4. (S) Leslie shared U/S Tauscher's view that 
 presidential-level engagement could help move Egypt away from 
 it's controversial Middle East resolution language and, 
 thereby, avoid derailing the NPT Review Conference in May. 
 However, she doubted whether engagement alone would be 
 enough.  Leslie stressed that Mubarak would also need a 
 high-visibility deliverable to take back to his public -- 
 though this deliverable would not necessarily require much 
 substance.  Specifically, she suggested that Egypt be 
 supported in its long-held goal to have an international 
 conference on the issue of nuclear security in the Middle 
 East.  Since Moscow wanted to be seen as a player in this 
 issue, Leslie believed that holding such a conference in 
 Russia could kill two birds with one stone. 
  
 5. (S) Leslie said she had discussed this idea with South 
 African counterparts and had agreed with them that it could 
 work.  U/S Tauscher stressed the need for assurances that 
 Egypt would stay in line during the NPT Review Conference. 
 In response, Leslie shared South African views that Egypt 
 would lose NAM support should Cairo be given support for a 
 conference and later still prove intransigent at the Revcon. 
 Moreover, Leslie suggested that Egypt might further be kept 
 in check by scheduling the conference after the NPT Revcon. 
 However, it would be important for other countries -- not the 
 U.S. or UK -- to push this idea forward.  As additional ways 
 to move Egypt, Leslie suggested the possibility of a meeting 
 between the Egyptian FM and foreign ministers from the NPT 
 depositary states.  She also raised the possibility of a 
 special reporteur -- though Leslie recognized that the French 
  
 BERLIN 00000194  002 OF 002 
  
  
 were opposed. 
  
 -------------- 
 Treaty Updates 
 -------------- 
  
 6. (S) Leslie said that she was increasingly under pressure 
 by British parliamentarians to cease stalled FMCT talks at 
 the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and move negotiations to 
 another venue.  However, she continued to push back because 
 the CD offered exposure to a broad range of nations -- 
 including nuclear states -- and because of the simple lack of 
 any alternative mechanism through which to discuss the issue. 
  Leslie believed that, in the future, such a move might be 
 necessary but that now was not the time. U/S Tauscher 
 underscored complaints from Islamabad that the U.S.-India 
 civilian nuclear agreement somehow short-changed Pakistan. 
 For her part, Leslie stressed the need to get Indians and 
 Pakistanis talking again -- even through back-channels. 
 Moreover, she said that it might be necessary to validate 
 Pakistani concerns, while still emphasizing to Islamabad that 
 these concerns are misplaced.  Nevertheless, we must make 
 clear to Pakistani officials that they cannot hold FMCT 
 negotiations hostage as a result. 
  
 7. (S) Leslie was thrilled to hear that the proposed Defense 
 Trade Treaty between the U.S. and UK was again moving in 
 Washington.  Meanwhile, in Moscow, Leslie said she had worked 
 to manage Russian expectations over U.S. ratification of the 
 CTBT.  Specifically, she underscored mid-term elections in 
 the U.S. and the Obama Administration's packed agenda as 
 reasons why USG ratification was unlikely this year. 
  
 8. (U) This cable was cleared with U/S Tauscher. 
 Delawie