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Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE338, SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 16-17 GICNT VISIT TO THE HAGUE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09THEHAGUE338 2009-06-10 03:03 2011-01-26 18:06 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0338/01 1610320
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100320Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2899
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0183
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000338 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PINR PINS PREL PTER KGIC NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 16-17 GICNT VISIT TO THE HAGUE 
 
REF: 08 STATE 132539 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified - not for Internet dist...




Sensitive but Unclassified - not for Internet distribution. 

1. (U) Welcome to The Hague. Your visit to The Hague can 
strengthen ties with a proven ally on many issues, especially 
on nonproliferation and counterterrorism. As co-chair of the 
5th Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), your focus will be on 
multi-lateral engagements. The following points on Dutch 
political events and specific foreign policy issues are 
background for your bilateral meetings with Dutch leaders. 

-------- 
Overview 
-------- 

2. (SBU) As a matter of policy and preference, the 
Netherlands primarily pursues its foreign policy interest 
within the framework of multilateral organizations, where the 
Dutch seek and often hold prominent roles far out of 
proportion to the small size of their nation. The Dutch see 
no contradiction between being good Europeans and good 
transatlanticists. They support both NATO and the EU and 
have engaged energetically to ensure that these two 
organizations pursue complementary rather than competitive 
objectives. In general, the Dutch share our view that the 
future of the transatlantic relationship will be determined 
less by what the U.S. does in Europe than by what the U.S. 
and Europe do together globally. They take their global 
responsibilities seriously and they usually are determined to 
include the United States in their global planning. They 
nurture democracy and human rights as a matter of policy. 

3. (SBU) Dutch political parties represent the political 
spectrum from far left to far right. The coalition 
government is made up of the Christian Democratic Alliance 
(CDA) with 41 seats in the lower chamber of parliament, the 
Labor Party (PvdA) with 33 seats, and the Christian Union 
Party with 6 seats (out of a 150 seat Second Chamber/Tweede 
Kamer). The government has survived some heated debates over 
the last year, including a difficult decision on the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) program last month. Political posturing 
has already begun for the 2011 parliamentary elections. The 
tensions within the coalition are heightened by the sharp 
rise in popularity and gains in the recent EU elections of 
the extreme right Freedom Party (PVV) headed by Geert 
Wilders, who plays to the emotions of the population on such 
divisive issues as immigration, religion, and individual 
rights. 


------------------------------------ 
Counterterrorism & Non-Proliferation 
------------------------------------ 

4. (U) The Dutch strongly subscribe to multilateral efforts 
to curb the spread of weapons and materials of mass 
destruction. They have supported U.S. efforts to uphold the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), especially in the 
instance of Iran. They are charter member of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), actively participate 
in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), 
and are members of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the 
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In 
addition to their effort in the political arena, they have 
committed financial resources to fund chemical weapon 
destruction facilities in the former Soviet Union. Dutch 
actively engage in virtually every non-proliferation fora and 
have consistently put the prevention of the spread of nuclear 
weapons at the top of their priorities for a common foreign 
Qweapons at the top of their priorities for a common foreign 
policy within the EU. They are leaders in the GICNT as shown 
by hosting the 5th Plenary Meeting in The Hague. 

5. (U) The Dutch are clearly taking the terrorist threat very 
seriously, expending significant financial and human 
resources since 9/11 to fight this problem. The Netherlands 
is a close ally in the fight against global terrorism. The 
Netherlands has ratified all the UN anti-terrorism 
conventions and, as a major financial center, takes strict 
measures to prevent terrorist financing very seriously. The 
Netherlands is an active member of the Financial Action Task 
Force FATF) and other groups fighting these financing 
networks. The Dutch have held trials for two groups 
suspected of plotting major terrorist attacks in the 
Netherlands. While not all the defendants were convicted, 
many were. In addition, at the request of the USG, the Dutch 
extradited one of their own nationals (a Dutch-Iraqi dual 
citizen) to the U.S. to stand trial for attempting to commit 
terrorist acts against American targets in Iraq. That 
deportee recently plead guilty in U.S. court. 

6. (U) The Netherlands has the second highest number of 
Muslims as a share of the population (roughly 5 percent) in 
Western Europe. This fact means the Dutch take seriously the 
potential threat of Islamic radicalization producing &home 
grown8 terrorists. The grizzly murder of Dutch film maker 
Theo van Gogh in 2004, by a radicalized native-born Dutchman 
of Moroccan extraction, drove home this point. 

------ 
Russia 
------ 

7. (U) The Dutch support strong Russian-European relations, 
but are troubled by anti-democratic trends within Russia and 
skeptical of Russian intentions in the territories of the 
former Soviet Union, especially Georgia. Within the EU, the 
Dutch lie between those states pushing for closer relations 
with Russia (i.e. France and Germany) and those new members 
whose Soviet-era experience makes them instinctively 
suspicious of Moscow. From this middle-ground, the Dutch are 
well-positioned to advocate a positive but realistic 
Russian-European agenda. Former Russian President Putin 
visited the Netherlands in November 2005, and Prime Minister 
Balkenende reciprocated by visiting Moscow in November 2007. 
Although Balkenende was later criticized in Parliament for 
signing a major pipeline deal with GAZPROM during the visit, 
he also used the occasion to speak out publicly in support of 
human rights and to meet with Russian NGOs promoting the rule 
of law. Dutch officials also argue that Dutch participation 
in the GAZPROM deal will bring greater transparency to the 
process of bringing Russian natural gas to European markets. 
President Medvedev is scheduled to visit the Netherlands in 
late June. 

---- 
Iran 
---- 

8. (U) The Dutch share U.S. concerns about the Iranian 
nuclear program and the U.S. view that Iran must comply with 
its obligation sunder the NPT. The Dutch have supported the 
efforts on the &EU-38 (UK, France and Germany) in 
negotiating with the Iranians to cease reprocessing of 
nuclear materials and open their facilities to IAEA 
inspection. The Dutch Parliament, concerned about the human 
rights situation in Iran, continues to push the government to 
take a tougher approach to Iran than that favored by many EU 
members. 

---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 

9. (SBU) To sum up, the Dutch leadership are strongly 
committed to nonproliferation and take an active role in 
promoting an agenda that parallels ours. Your bi-lateral 
engagements with the Dutch will be very welcome and they will 
look to you for insights into the new Administration's 
thinking on the future of the myriad of issues confronting 
nonproliferation and counterterrorism challenges. 

GALLAGHER