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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI410, CHAD AMBASSADOR: LIBYA CAN DO NOTHING IF SUDAN UNWILLING TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI410 2009-05-20 06:06 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO8640
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0410 1400646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 200646Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4842
INFO RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0173
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0161
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0030
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5372
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL SU CD LY AU
SUBJECT: CHAD AMBASSADOR: LIBYA CAN DO NOTHING IF SUDAN UNWILLING TO 
KEEP PROMISES 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Chadian Ambassador Daoussa Deby called on the Ambassador on May 14 to provide an update on recent fighting in eastern Chad and denounce Sudan's recurring efforts to destabilize his country. Deby said his government had "no problem with Sudan", but was instead a victim of problems in Darfur. Nonetheless, Deby complained that Sudan had repeatedly reneged on its commitment to peace negotiations in Tripoli, Dakar, Khartoum, and Doha, adding that Libya could "do nothing" with a government that was unwilling to fulfill its obligations. Citing Khartoum's swift violation of the core principles of the February 17 Doha agreement between the GOS and JEM, he noted that Sudan's willingness to violate accords extended beyond bilateral agreements, .

2.(C) Deby reported that Chad was very satisfied with the USG position and support of the recent PRST condemning UFR attacks and GOS support for the rebels. He said the UFR invaded with over 800 trucks and that fighting was ongoing, but that Chad's armed forces had captured fighters, vehicles, weapons, and "many documents" from the rebels. While he characterized Libya's position on the PRST as "unfriendly", he said relations between Chad and Libya were still normal and that President Idriss Deby and Muammar al-Qadhafi had a close relationship. Chad deferred to Libya's desire to move the May 28-30 CEN-SAD summit to the Libyan town of Sirte, and supported Libya's efforts to move the July 1-3 AU Summit to the same location.

3.(C) Comment and bio note: Deby spoke largely in general terms and stuck to points already delivered to Embassy N'Djamena. He mentioned that al-Qadhafi's chief of staff, Bashir Saleh, helped manage Libya's relationship with various rebel groups, but did not discuss his own relationship with JEM's Tripoli representative, Suliman Abdalla Ismael. Deby said he had been in Tripoli only 10 days since presenting his credentials. While he did not request specific support, Deby spent much of the meeting recounting how he had previously represented Chad as their Ambassador to Libya from 1997-2003. Claiming a weak facility with English, he conducted most of the meeting in French. His ability to speak and understand Arabic seemed advanced. End comment and bio note. CRETZ