Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 5408 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09MANAMA91, BAHRAIN AS "IRAN'S FOURTEENTH PROVINCE"

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MANAMA91.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MANAMA91 2009-02-17 13:01 2011-02-18 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Manama
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMK #0091 0481355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX2FAB06 MSI6071-623)
P 171355Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8448
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  (GARBLED TEXT) 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2029 
TAGS: PREL PBTS EG IR BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN AS "IRAN'S FOURTEENTH PROVINCE" 
 
REF: MANAMA 57  Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)  

1.  (C) Summary:  After an Iranian official spoke of supposed Iranian claims to Bahrain, Egypt's President visited Manama in a demonstration of Arab solidarity.  The Iranian statement is being spun to embarrass those - like Qatar and Bahraini oppositionists - who allegedly sympathize with Iran.  End summary.  

2.  (U) Bahrain and other Arab governments pounced on media reports that an Iranian official described Bahrain as "Iran's fourteenth province."  International Arabic daily Al Quds al Arabi February 10 attributed the statement to Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, described as "inspector general" in the office of Supreme Leader Khamenei.  Nateq-Nuri was formerly Interior Minister and speaker of Iran's parliament.  

3.  (U) Bahrain's MFA told media that foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifah summoned Iranian Ambassador Hossein Amir-Abdolahian to protest. Amir-Abdolahian separately told the press that Nateq-Nuri's statement did not reflect Iranian government policy.  

4.  (SBU) Egypt's president Mubarak visited Bahrain for a few hours February 16 and publicly denounced "outside interference."  MFA contacts told us the visit was arranged on short notice in reaction to Nateq-Nuri's outburst.  The SecGens of the Arab League and GCC, as well as the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have all spoken out in support of Bahrain.  Comment  

5.  (C) The gaffe attributed to Nateq-Nuri provided Bahrain and other moderate Arab governments with an opportunity to put the Iranians on the PR defensive, and to shame Qatar for bringing Iran into Arab counsels. Inside Bahrain, the GOB is also using this episode to amplify its ongoing campaign (reftel) against allegedly disloyal radicals among Bahrain's Shia.  

6.  (C) In private, Bahrain's leaders do not seem very concerned about the prospect of annexation to Iran.  For example, during a meeting February 17 with Codel Pingree, Crown Prince Salman ticked off a long list of Iranian offenses against regional stability (including support for Hizballah and Hamas, nuclear ambitions, and "conspiring" with Qatar to split the Arabs) but made only a brief, dismissive mention of Nateq-Nuri's February 10 eruption.     

Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/  HENZEL