Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 5408 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09STATE3691, RESPONDING TO UKRAINIAN QUESTIONS CONCERNING USG

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09STATE3691.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE3691 2009-01-14 16:04 2011-01-26 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
P R 141616Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
INFO PAGE 02        STATE   003691  141623Z
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KYIV
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 003691 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE KSCA PARM PREL MNUC ETTC TSPA UP BR
 
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO UKRAINIAN QUESTIONS CONCERNING USG 
SUPPORT FOR UKRAINIAN-BRASILIAN SLV JOINT VENTURE AT ALCANTARA (C) 

REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 001652 
B. 05 STATE 141756 (AND PREVIOUS) 
Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. Reason: 1.5 (B), (D). 

1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Brasilia, please see paragraph 7. 

2. (C) BACKGROUND: REF A reports that the Ukrainian Embassy in Brasilia is urging the U.S. to reconsider its position on support for the Ukrainian-Brazilian Tsyklon Space Launch Project and allow the launch of U.S. satellites from Brazil's Alcantara launch site on the Tsyklon (Cyclone) launch vehicle. As noted REF B, the U.S. will not authorize the launch of U.S. satellites or foreign satellites with U.S.-licensed components from Alcantara until the U.S.-Brazil Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA), which Brazil has yet to ratify, enters into effect. Additionally, while the U.S. is prepared to support the joint Ukrainian-Brazilian project once the U.S.-Brazil TSA becomes active, it does not support Brazil's indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV) program. 

3. (C) ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND FOR POSTS' INFORMATION ONLY: For several years, Brazil and Ukraine have been seeking to establish a launch facility for the Ukrainian Tsyklon (Cyclone) SLV at Alcantara. The two countries have signed an umbrella space agreement and a Technology Safeguards Agreement to facilitate this project, but neither country has had the funds needed to establish a Tsyklon launch facility. A key impediment to funding is the current inability to launch U.S. satellites (and non-U.S. satellites with U.S.-licensed components) from Alcantara. 

4. The U.S. currently does not permit launches of U.S. satellites or foreign satellites with U.S.-licensed components from Alcantara because of our longstanding policy not to "encourage" Brazil's SLV program (or other MTCR-country SLV programs the U.S. did not support before the advent of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987). However, in 1999 the U.S. decided that it would be prepared to permit such launches from Alcantara on Tsyklon (as well as on U.S. SLVs) if Brazil would conclude a TSA with the U.S. that would both protect against unauthorized technology transfer and provide a credible basis for the U.S. to maintain that permitting such launches would not "encourage" Brazil's own SLV program. 

5. Such a TSA was negotiated and signed in April 2000. Entry into force, however, required ratification by the Brazilian Senate (for the U.S., the TSA is an Executive Agreement), which refused to ratify the TSA, citing sovereignty concerns. In November 2003, Brazil indicated it was ready to initiate discussions with the U.S. on renegotiating the April 2000 TSA to address its Congress' concerns and permit ratification. Since then, Brazil has sporadically sought U.S. views on various informal renegotiation proposals. The latest such Brazilian effort occurred in September 2005, when the GOB asked whether the USG would be prepared to resolve certain issues by means of a mutually agreed public, unilateral declaration by the GOB. We responded in November 2005 that we would be prepared to work on this basis, as long as the total TSA package preserves sufficient technical and legal safeguards, including on the political level, to address our proliferation concerns. We also indicated that if Brazil wished to pu rsue this issue, it should get back to us with a formal renegotiation request, including specifics on the wording of the unilateral declaration. Brazil has not raised the issue since that November 2005 discussion. 

6. (C) PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: In response to REF A request, we want to remind Ukrainian officials that the U.S. does not oppose establishing a Tsyklon launch site at Alcantara, as long as that activity does not result in the transfer of rocket technology to Brazil and that U.S. policy on support for this effort has not changed. Specifically, the U.S. will be prepared to permit Tsyklon to launch U.S. satellites, and foreign satellites with U.S. licensed components, from Alcantara once our bilateral TSA with Brazil enters into effect. 

7. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Request Embassy Brasilia respond to Ukrainian Embassy queries concerning the Ukrainian-Brazilian space launch joint venture at Alcantara, making the following points: --As we have discussed previously with your government, the U.S. will be prepared to support the Ukrainian-Brazilian space launch joint venture at Alcantara once our bilateral Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) with Brazil enters into effect. --However, until the TSA becomes active, the U.S. will not/not be prepared to permit Tsyklon to launch U.S. satellites and foreign satellites with U.S.-licensed components from Alcantara. --The TSA was signed in 2000, but Brazil has been unable to ratify it to date. If pressed for further information on the status of our TSA with Brazil, post should urge Ukrainian officials to discuss the issue with their Brazilian partners. NOTE: Embassy Kyiv may doubletrack this response with host government officials as appropriate. END NOTE. 

8. (U) Washington POCs are ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham (Phone: XXXXX) and ISN/MTR Kennedy Wilson (Phone: XXXX). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and WHA/BSC. 

RICE NNNN 

End Cable Text