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Viewing cable 08THEHAGUE625, NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DUTCH VIEWS ON SUDAN,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08THEHAGUE625 2008-07-24 08:08 2011-01-17 15:03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0625/01 2060856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240856Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1773
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0457
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0088
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0134
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0075
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0134
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0440
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018
 
TAGS: PREL EAID NL SO SU XW ZI
 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DUTCH VIEWS ON SUDAN, 
ZIMBABWE, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 587 
     B. BRUSSEL...



163331,7/24/2008 8:56,08THEHAGUE625,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,08BRUSSELS1098|08THEHAGUE587,"VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0625/01 2060856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240856Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1773
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0457
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0088
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0134
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0075
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0134
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0440
","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000625
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018
TAGS: PREL EAID NL SO SU XW ZI
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DUTCH VIEWS ON SUDAN,
ZIMBABWE, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA.
REF: A. THE HAGUE 587
B. BRUSSELS 1098
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew Mann, Reasons 1.5 (b
,d)

1. (U) SUMMARY: Wepke Kingma, MFA Director of the Sub-Sahara
Africa Department recently discussed the Dutch position on
Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Horn of Africa. END SUMMARY.

Sudan
-----

2. (C) Regarding the recent ICC indictment of Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, the Dutch have expressed public
support for the ICC, but Kingma believes the timing for the
indictment is poor. Though Kingma made it clear the Dutch
would not publicly state this, he believes that pursuing the
indictment for Bashir will prove costly to any negotiations
and likely backfire. Plans for a Dutch contribution to
UNAMID will be ""pushed back"" because a group of Dutch
legislators returned from the region ""foaming at the mouth""
with concerns about the security situation.

Zimbabwe
--------

3. (C) The Dutch government continues to be an engaged and
concerned observer of Zimbabwe, though Kingma admits that
much of the public ignores the issue. Kingma noted that it
was possible Mugabe would attempt to buy the support of rival
political parties in an attempt to create a coalition
government that will be acceptable to the West but which
Mugabe would still control. Although, in Kingma,s view, the
rest of the world may be underestimating the South Africans
in the Zimbabwe negotiations, he feels Mugabe is probably
just ""buying time"" with the negotiations process. The Dutch
continue to look at what sanctions will truly hurt the Mugabe
regime.

4. (C) In a July 17 discussion between Poloffs and Melle
Leemstra, MFA desk officer for Zimbabwe, and Wouter Plomp,
head of the middle and southern Africa division, the Dutch
reported the EU,s sanction plan (reftel B). The United
Kingdom will push for further measures, including an
investment ban, to be enacted in September. However, the
remaining foreign investments in Zimbabwe are British and
American, and pursuing an investment ban is difficult. The
Dutch wonder, ""Is the U.S. working with non-EUR states on
sanctions, or contemplating action by the Human Rights
Council?"" The Dutch urge creativity in pursuing additional
measures. For example, governments could use ""moral suasion""
rather than an investment ban, with press statements such as
""it,s inconceivable to do business in Zimbabwe."" Tesco, UK
has stopped buying from Zimbabwe, and Shell is also
considering a sale of assets in Zimbabwe.

5. (C) Plomp wondered if the negative votes from Russia,
China and South Africa on the UN sanctions were a surprise to
the United States. The Dutch noted the need for South Africa
to find a ""graceful way out"" for Mugabe, so perhaps it would
be better to ease the pressure on South Africa. Minister for
Development Cooperation Bert Koenders noted (in a
conversation with A/S Frazier) that there should be some
cooperation between the negotiations in South Africa and the
brandishing of international sanctions. The Dutch concede
that it will be difficult to coordinate the bureaucratic and
political sides on a timeline.

6. (C) Plomp took note of the need to consider the eventual
reconstruction of Zimbabwe, with recent South African
Development Community estimates running around two to three
billion dollars. The Dutch maintain that it will be key for
""northern"" countries to coordinate.

Horn of Africa
--------------

7. (C) Somali PM Nur Hassan Hussein visited the Netherlands
July 10. According to Kingma, the Dutch told him they were
ready to give aid to Somalia, especially for local police
forces. The Netherlands is actively working towards a
solution with neighboring countries to address the
lawlessness. The latest report by the International Crisis
Group was a disappointment as it just ""pulls out the latest
toolbox"" with proposals such as naming a special envoy, but
does not address the ""underlying issues.""

8. (C) Though an outspoken critic of the regime, the Dutch
have been directly speaking with Ethiopia this year since it
is willing to engage on critical issues such as Ogaden and
Somalia. Eritrea, however, will not discuss Somalia with the
Dutch. Norway,s FM Store told Dutch FM Verhagen that the
border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia was a key to
resolving the Somalia problem. Kingma thinks that is
""bullshit,"" but the FM asked for a paper on the issue.\

9. (C) Comment: Kingma,s frank talk did not provide any
surprises but reflected his four years, experience leading
Dutch Africa policy. It was also emblematic of the Dutch
penchant for blunt remarks to allies. For example, Kingma
suggested the way to deal with Lord,s Resistance Army leader
Joseph Kony would be for the United States to ""put a price
on"" his head and encourage local figures in the Congo to
""take care"" of him. End Comment.