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Viewing cable 06LIMA2415, FUJIMORISTAS LOOKING FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA2415 2006-06-16 16:04 2011-02-20 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Lima
Appears in these articles:
http://elcomercio.pe/
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2415/01 1671639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161639Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1052
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3570
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9603
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN QUITO 0466
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0654
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6845
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4285
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KCRM PINR PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORISTAS LOOKING FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH 
GARCIA GOVERNMENT IN RETURN FOR "IMPARTIALITY" 
 
Classified By: Polcouns...

id: 68387
date: 6/16/2006 16:39
refid: 06LIMA2415
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 
header:
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2415/01 1671639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161639Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1052
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3570
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9603
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN QUITO 0466
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0654
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6845
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4285
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002415 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KCRM PINR PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORISTAS LOOKING FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH 
GARCIA GOVERNMENT IN RETURN FOR "IMPARTIALITY" 

Classified By: Polcouns Alexander Margulies.  Reason: 1.4(d). 

1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Legislators-elect Keiko and Santiago 
Fujimori, in a 6/12 meeting with Polcouns, said that their 
13-member congressional bloc would be disciplined, and is 
prepared to work constructively with the incoming Garcia 
government in return for an end to "political persecution" 
and "impartiality" in the legal treatment of ex-President 
Alberto Fujimori.  The Fujimoristas praised President-elect 
Alan Garcia's political acumen, thought that they could reach 
an arrangement with him that would satisfy both parties, and 
expected the Apristas would continue to detach legislators 
elected on Ollanta Humala's Union por el Peru (UPP) ticket. 
They expressed concern, however, over the social situation in 
isolated rural areas, particularly in the pro-Humala south, 
which they thought could be incited to violence by Humala or 
his followers.  They doubted that the Garcia administration 
would have the time or capability to adequately address these 
demands in time to affect the November regional/municipal 
elections.  END SUMMARY. 

2.  (C)  Polcouns met for 90 minutes with legislators-elect 
Keiko and Santiago Fujimori, who were accompanied by former 
minister and President of Congress Jaime Yoshiyama, at 
Santiago Fujimori's office on 6/12.  In a wide-ranging 
discussion, the Fujimoristas addressed the following issues: 

--  RELATIONS WITH THE GARCIA GOVERNMENT:  Keiko and Santiago 
were confident that the 13-member Fujimorista legislative 
bloc will remain loyal and disciplined, thereby providing 
them with significant leverage in a divisive and 
inexperienced Congress.  They hope to have a "constructive" 
relationship with the incoming Garcia Government, and will 
support policies that promote fiscal responsibility, 
increased foreign and domestic investment, free markets and 
free trade (including implementation of the Free Trade 
Agreement - Keiko said that she would ask her father to phone 
current Fujimorista legislator Marta Moyano to ensure that 
she backs the FTA), increased compensation for "losers" in 
the FTA, particularly in the agricultural sector, and 
augmented social spending, especially in rural areas.  In 
return, they expect an end to the "political persecution" of 
Fujimoristas carried out under the current administration of 
President Alejandro Toledo, as well as "impartial" treatment 
for ex-President Alberto Fujimori in the extradition and 
criminal cases against him.  Santiago declared that an ideal 
solution would be a deal under which Alberto could return to 
Peru and help siphon off votes from Humala in the November 
regional/municipal elections.  Keiko commented that she 
doubted Garcia's ego would countenance her father's presence 
in Peru, but Santiago rejoined that he thought an arrangement 
could be worked out. 

--  PRAISE FOR GARCIA:  Yoshiyama was effuse with praise for 
Garcia's and the Apristas' political acumen.  He noted that 
the President-elect is not/not one to bear grudges, and, 
despite having been the focus of criminal proceedings by the 
Fujimori Government, has let the Fujimoristas know that they 
will not/not face similar treatment under his government 
(NOTE:  Keiko, Santiago and Yoshiyama have all faced criminal 
processes since Alberto went into exile, and Santiago 
currently is prohibited from leaving the country in 
connection with criminal charges related to the purchase of 
the presidential jet.  END NOTE).  Keiko and Santiago agreed 
that Garcia and his followers are adept at negotiating with 
other political forces, and put political expediency ahead of 
ideological or moral purity.  Keiko said that the 
Fujimoristas are open to talks with the Apristas, while 
Santiago and Yoshiyama indicated that such talks are already 
underway, the latter naming several former Fujimori-era 
officials who could serve as ministers under Garcia. 

--  BUT CONCERN ABOUT APRA'S CAPABILITIES:  Santiago thought 
that Garcia's stated policies of political inclusion, 
government austerity, openness to globalization and the world 
economy, and increased social programs for marginalized areas 
were the right way to go, but expressed doubts that the 
President-elect has the time or human resources necessary to 
make an impact in time to affect the regional/municipal 
elections.  The APRA leader needs to start to build a 
supporting political coalition now, he commented, rather than 
wait until his inauguration.  If he does not, Santiago 
warned, the earliest that Congress (which takes office on 
July 28 and traditionally spends the first month of each 

opening session bargaining over committee chairmanships) 
could organize itself to act would be September-October.  He 
also doubted that APRA has the human resources necessary to 
adequately staff the technocrat positions needed to 
effectively implement the needed social policies, adding that 
Garcia's vow to halve GOP salaries at the upper and 
managerial levels would have a negative impact on recruiting 
talented professionals.  If Garcia staffs these jobs with 
APRA hacks, he warned, his presidency will be an even bigger 
disaster than his first term. 

--  THE HUMALA FACTOR:  Yoshiyama, referring to the 
announcement earlier that day that three UPP 
congressmen-elect had split from the Humalista bloc (Septel), 
said that it was to be expected that Humala's congressional 
delegation would fracture given its impromtu formation and 
the quality of its members.  He explained that many of 
Humala's rural representatives at one time or another were in 
the Fujimorista ranks, and characterized most of them as 
unreliable "trash" who will graze where the grass is 
greenest.  Santiago agreed with this assessment, but worried 
that Humala will always have the temptation to radicalize his 
approach and incite his followers to demonstrations or acts 
of violence, and that a shedding of congressional 
representatives could spur him to adopt this course.  He 
characterized the south as a time bomb that could explode at 
any time, while Keiko said that other isolated and 
marginalized rural areas are just as discontented.  She 
expressed concern that Humalistas could win the regional 
elections in the 15 departments taken by Humala in the 
presidential second round, adding that the Fujimoristas would 
present rival candidates in those regions and municipalities 
where they could find nominees of unquestioned quality and 
probity. 

3.  (C)  COMMENT:  The Fujimoristas know that their 13-member 
congressional bloc gives them a strong card to play in 
negotiations with the Garcia government, as they attempt to 
parlay their support in return for an arrangement that 
relaxes Alberto Fujimori's legal situation.  To what extent 
those discussions prosper remains to be seen.  Santiago's and 
Keiko's worries about the Garcia administration's time-frame 
for action and capabilities to implement needed policies are 
well taken, as are their concerns that Humala could exploit 
frustrations in marginalized areas to threaten governability 
and/or gain control over regional and municipal governments 
there.  END COMMENT. 




STRUBLE 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================